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Edrnar Lisboa Ba.cha 
and 
Carlos F. Diaz Alejandro 
(Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro and Yale University) 
Private international financial intermediation has witnessed 
successive cycles for the last 160 years. In this century, it blosscmed 
before the First World War and through the 1920s. In the 1930s and 
1940s, private capital markets went into an eclipse, to reappear 
t1midly in. the 1950s, beaning in the 1960s and 1970s. Theorizing 
about financial markets has on the whole followed those cycles. Few 
are the examples of powerful propositions emerging f'ran general 
financial theories which are independent of historically-specific 
institutional arrangements. 
'Ibis pa.per discusses the interplay of financial aspects of 
the history of world capitalism with theorizing about financial markets, 
carried out rna.1nly in Northern countries. It is organized as follows. 
Three epochs in financial arrangement and theories are first briefly 
reviewed, giving special emphasis to their impact on peripheral countries. 
They are the pre-1929 years, 1944-1973 and 1973-1980. A long section 
on the 1970s stylized facts follows. Then some systemic issues of international 
financial arrangements for the 1980s are discussed. Finally, sane 
aspects of the impact of international financial markets on I.atin America 
are noted, and analytical problems suggested by unexpected conse-
quences of recent attempts at financial reform in I.atin America are 
debated. 
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Frequent references will be made to orthodoxy. 'Ihis term is 
not easy to define; it may be helpful to separate "academic" fran 
"practical orthcxioxy 11 The fonner is the product of leading academic• 
centers of the tirre; it te~ds to be flexible and agnostic. Its 
leading thinkers often are its own major critics, frequently curious 
about heterodox notions. Practical orthodoxy is roore assertive. It 
is found in the editorials of the business press, among private or 
public executives with .Masters' degrees, and among sane of the roore 
politically or rinancially ambitious academics. The latter scxnet1mes 
play a double role: in their Northern universities, disciplined by 
their colleagues, they are cautious scientists; during their surrrner 
tours or the periphery, their libido 1.JTperante unleashed, they becane 
fountainheads of practical orthodoxy. 
It is practical orthodoxy that puts the system to work and 
typically sets the Northern tone in North-South debates. As such it 
will be the ma.in focus of our analysis. 
I-The Pax Britannica 
The pre-1929 international financial order enjoyed a degree of 
intellectual hegemony which has never been regained. The gold-exchange 
standard was regarded as the natural regulator of the balance of payments. 
Current account deficits and increases in international reserves were 
financed using bonds with long maturities and fixed interest rates as 
well as via direct investments. Under the long Pax Britannica sane 
countries (Germany, the USA) graduated from the role of capital importers 
to that of capital exporters. At least until the 1920s, London ruled 
the waves and regulated the whole system,!/ whose occasional cri~es 
were regarded as passing aberrations or a necessary purging of 
"excesses". 
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National fina~cial systems showed greater heterogeneity. In 
the United States populist pressures blocked the creation of a central 
bank until early this centl:ll"Y. France and Germany developed financial 
systems nnre centralized and state-dominated than that of the United 
Kingdom, as analyzed by Alexander Gershenkron. Apparently, British 
hegemony in international relations of all types explains the greater 
hanogeneity of the international financial rules of the game, in 
contrast with those applicable nationally. 
African and Asian colonies had little choice 1n their 
financial systems, and tended to follow prevailing orthodoxy. Several 
1.ndeperxient Latin American countries, however, had difficulties 
adhering faithfully to the gold-exchange standard.Y Mexico followed 
a silver stan:iard for many years, while s11ver depreciated vis-a-vis 
gold. Argentina and Brazil often resorted to an "inconvertible 
paper standard", frequently acccxnpanied by fiscal deficits and inflation 
(the U.S. went through a similar period after its Civil War). 
These Latin American experiments with flexible exchange rates 
were viewed with fascinated disgust by orthodox scholars and bankers. 
'lhe recurrent need for foreign finance as well as danestic political 
pressures to keep debt service from taking too much of a share of the 
budget would sporadically dictate a return to the gold-exchange standard 
and greater controls over danestic credit expansion. Foreign missions 
played important roles in attempted returns to orthodoxy. F.xarrples 
include the Montagu Mission to Brazil in 1924 and those of Professor Edwin 
Kerrmerer to several Andean countries.11 At least in the case of the 
Brazilian return to the gold-exchange standard in the 1920s, the 
economic results are regarded as negative. During the 1920s the 
League of Nations also participated in missions associated with
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Stabilization Plans 1n countries such as Austria and Hungary.-
The conditionality attached to international lending before 
1929 included not only that linked to the natural desire of bankers 
to be punctually paid at least the interest due on loans. Political 
considerations also played a role in regulating access to capital 
markets. French and German lending were heavily influenced by 
political factors, as illustrated by the fonner's loans to Czarist 
Russia and the latter's loans to the Middle Fast •.2.1 Brazilian access 
to the New York market was blocked by Herbert Hoover, -then Secretary of 
Carmerce, in retaliation for the Brazilian coffee valorization scheme; 
Brazilian access to the London market 1n the late 1920s was also discreetly 
vetoed by the Foreign Office 1n retaliation for the Brazilian withdrawal 
from the League of Nations.61 
The conditionality 1mposed before 1929 on the weakest peripheral 
countries included foreign control over their tariff revenues and other 
aspects of their fiscal and monetary machinery; this was the case of sane 
Caribbean and Central American nations, in a fashion s1m1lar to that of 
Zaire during the 1970s. 
The great depression of the 1930s destroyed the gold-exchange 
standard and international capital markets as they existed before 1929. 
The prestige of high finance collapsed; in the USA financiers were the 
target of New Deal attacks, and new legislation limited the flexibility of 
national and international financial intennediaries. European nazi-fascism 
popularized exchange and financial controls going beyond those practiced 
in other industrialized countries. Several industrial countries declared 
nnratoria on danestic debts and witnessed drastic restructuring of 
their financial systems. 
-5-
Peripheric countries with certain political autonany, such 
as Argentina, Brazil and Colanbia, reacted to the Great Depression 
with a fairly rapid abandonment of gold standard orthodoxy, wisely 
avoiding classical remedies. Thus, Brazil was advised by a mission 
headed by Sir Otto Niemeyer, of the Bank of England, to return to 
7/ 
a fixed exchange rate and to maintain convertibility, on July 1931!-
These large or active Latin American countries allowed substantial 
depreciations of their exchange rate, imposed exchange controls and 
maintained a reasonable degree of danestic liquidity. Nonnal debt 
servicing was suspended 1n mst cases, just as U.S. fanners suspended 
payments on their rnortgages. Partly due to the closing of international 
markets, Latin American countries showed greater interest in rnobilizing 
dorrestic resources via the tax system and the creation of new gove:rnnent 
controlled credit institutions. The econanic perfonnance of these 
countries during the 1930s was remarkably good, better than that of 
major industrialized countries. 
II. The Pax Americana 
The international financial order which emerged from Bretton 
Woods in 1944, lasting until 1973, initially reflected the 1930s 
disenchantment with laissez faire in financial transactions and was 
influenced by Fabian/New Deal notions then daninant in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. The then United States Secretary of 
the Treasury, Mr. Henry Morgenthau, regarded Bretton Woods as the 
achievement of his lifetime ambition to '-'drive ••the usurious moneylenders 
from the temple of international finance."~ 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was born accepting changes 
in exchange rates to correct "fundamental disequilibrium" and allowing 
controls over capital movements. The International Ba.nk for Reconstruction 
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and Development (IBPO) reflected pess:1m1sm regarding the viability of 
private financial intermediation in the postwar world. In the USA, 
the official EXIMBANJ<, created in the 1930s originally to finance 
trade with the USSR, was to play an important role in financing 
US exports of capital goods, and was a critical institution in US­
Latin American econanic relations. Already in the 1950s and even 
more so in the-1960s, the original Fabian/New Deal flavor of the 
Bretton Woods institutions was diluted, but they continued to renect 
certain theoretical and practical eclecticism absent in the pre-1929 
international financial order. 
At least during the late 1940s and 1950s, both national and 
international financial intennediation received low priority. The 
ultra-Keynesian notion that ''money does not matter" could easily be 
extended. to "financial intermediation does not matter". It was not 
until the late 1950s that Europe abandoned. rigorous exchange controls 
(the United. K:1ngdcxn maintained them until 1979) • 
F.a.rly in the postwar, a new practical orthodoxy appeared 
regarding capital iooverrents. It became coomon to hear advice~ 
at peripheral countries regarding the inportance of ma.inta.ining a 
favorable climate for direct foreign investments fran the North. Before 
1929, especially before the First World War, portfolio investments had 
dominated those of a direct nature, and a good investment cl1rnate involved 
mainly the punctual servicing of the debt. Direct foreign invesbrent, 
suppliers' credits plus official development assistance of various 
sorts made up the bulk of capital inflows into the periphery well into 
the 1960s. All of these forms of finance implied a canplex and fairly 
intimate relationship between lenders and borrowers. 
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Acade7~C orthod0xy had surprisingly little to say about the 
benefits and costs of the postwar structure of capital flows between 
North and South. Tnere was a tendency to add up all forms of capital 
flows into one aggregate necessary to finance the "foreign exchange 
gap". A comron attitude was that the greater this aggregate flow, the 
better all around. This academic complacency was first punctured by 
peripheral (and Australian, Canadian, and European) criticism of 
sane of the consequences of direct foreign investment and of multi­
national corporations. Sane aspects of official develoµnent assistance 
also came under closer scrutiny, leading to more sophisticated 
evaluations of the grant element involved in such flows. 
As noted earlier, &I.ready in the 1950s the IMF and the IBRD 
began to depart fran the vision of at least sane of their founding 
fathers, especially that of John Maynard Keynes. The IBRD stuck to the 
financing of specific projects, avoiding program lending. 'Ihe IBRD 
also refused to lend to oil state enterprises, arguing that there were 
plenty of private oil corporations willing to invest. The IMF staff 
increasingly favored rigid exchange rates buttressed by rigorous credit 
policies, in a pattern similar to the pre-1929 rules of the game. In 
its dealings with peripheral countries given to heterodoxy, such as 
several Latin American countries, the IMF missions revived the spirit of 
Montagu and Niemeyer, advocating stiff stabilization plans. It could 
be argued that at least during the 1950s the leverage of the IMF missions 
was not snaller than those of M:>ntagu and Niemeyer, as international 
credit sources in the 1950s were few, and tended to follow the leadership 
of the IMF ( and the US Treasury) • The consequences of the practical 
orthodoxy of the IMF were not very different from those of the Montagu 
mission. 
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As late as the 1960s, those advocating greater resource 
transfers fran North to South would call for more official development 
assistance under va.,.. ...ious fonns. Regional development banks were 
created, adding new official financial intennediaries. New aid 
relationships were sought. Hopes were also expressed for a new 
spirit in direct foreign investment. 
In the.meanwhile, the great postwar econanic expansion 
which culmina.ted 1n the early 1970s was creating new conditions eroding 
the postwar practical orthodoxy. Almost accidentally, a truly inter­
national capital market emerged around the m1d-1960s, 1n the fonn of 
EurocUITency credits. 
'!he El.trodollar market, based on dollar deposits in banks 
outside the United States, arose from the desire of derna.nders and 
suppliers of those deposits to avoid actual or potential U.S. banking 
regulations. The Soviets were among the first depositors of dollars 
in banks located 1n Europe; they feared that accounts opened in the 
United States might be attached by U.S. citizens who had claims against 
the USSR. furing tight credit conditions in 1968 and 1969 U.S. com­
mer•cial banks bid for dollars in the Eurodollar market by offering yields 
above those pennitted 1n the U.S. by Regulation Q, which dates back 
to 1933. B:mks based in IJ::>ndon and other European financial centers 
found that accepting dollar deposits and extending dollar loans was 
profitable, with reserve requirements dictated only by what each bank 
deened prudent. The tacit approval of Central B:mks was of course 
necessary. The practice of accepting deposits in cUITencies other than 
that used locally spread to sterling, Gennan marks, Swiss francs and 
others; banks outside Europe also joined the market which now encooipasses 
agents in Singapore, the Caribbean and elsewhere. 
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Growing macroeconardc disharmonies am::ing the industrialized 
countries in the late 1960s, the US involvement in Vietnam, and 
increased capital J'OC>bility put enorm::>us pressures on fixed parities. 
These c1rc\El1Stances led to abandonment by the US of gold convertibility 
in August 1971 and to generalized floating of key currencies in early 
1973. This Annus Mirabilis culminated with the sharp rise in oil 
prices, putting an·end of the postwar era of cheap energy. 
III. Pax Arabica? 
The period 1973-1980 has been highly unusual in the history 
of international finance. A new type of capital exporter has emerged, 
which has no historical precedent. Consider the following contrast 
between OPEC capital ·exporters and those of earlier eras: 
a) The military power of major OPEC countries is trivial, 
certainly insufficient to enforce financial contracts against recalcitrant 
debtors. It has been noted that every lender ultimately needs bailiffs 
at his back;W OPEC does not have them. 
b) OPEC countries lack capital goods industries, or indeed an 
extensive industrial base, to achieve the real transfer ultimately 
desired by foreign-exchange-constrained capital inporters. OPEC's 
technological base is weak. It is difficult to imagine the equivalent 
to British exports of railway equipment or US direct foreign investment 
for the OPEC case. Oil is a nonrenewable asset for OPEC, but a current 
input for inporters. 
c) OPEC capital exporters had during 1973-80 only limited 
financial institutions of their own; they have relied heavily on 
financial intermediaries of industrialized countries. 
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d) OPEC national cu..TTencies are used only marginally as 
reserve or vehicle currencies; the influence of OPEC over international 
monetary arrangements is growing, but is still modest. 
e) The rnaj or component of OPEC wealth is a nonrenewable 
resource. If investment in financial or real assets yield low rates 
of return, OPEC countries could adjust by decreasing their 
oil output, 1.e. , by investing in oil under ground. 'Ihus, part of 
OPEC's "home investment" could decrease the world's aggregate supply 
in the short and medium term. 
These considerations imply a good deal of interdependence 
between the old and the new capital exporters, involving both econanic 
and political aspects. The latter have becane highly visible since 
1973 in contrast with previous years, when they were discreetly hidden. 
The network of trade flows has also becane more canplex and multilateral, 
involving greater triangu.larity among old and new capital exporters 
and the Third World. 
The Eurocurrency market and international banking, already 
vigorous before 1973, have turned out to be (on the whole) flexible 
and efficacious instruments to accoom:xiate the new capital exporters and 
the major semi-industrialized capital importers. A closer look at the 
Eurocurrency market and its links with the OPEC surplus is WarTanted. 
Many transactions in Eurocurrency markets are between banks, 
and produce a limited amountof maturity transformation. International 
corporations also engage in considerable borrowing and lending in those 
markets. Depending on circumstances, economic agents switch fran OECD 
national financial markets to the Eurocurrency market, and vice-versa. 




















international banking and OECD financial markets more generally may 
be viewed as a giant bathtub within which much churning (gross 
financial intermediation) takes place, and where ripples in one 
sef2fl}ent are quickly transmitted to other se~nts. 
Net inflows into and net outflows out of this bathtub can 
be defined in a number of ways, depending on one's analytical focus, 
including desired level of aggregation. In this paper we will be 
interested mainly in the role of financial markets as providers of 
Ba.lance of Payments net financing to large groups of LDCs, as well as 
their role as receivers of net inflows from OPEC. 
It should be clear that Eurocurrency markets have a life and 
a financial role which are independent of OPEC surpluses, just as their 
coming into being was not caused by U.S. balance of payments deficits 
of the 1960s. 'Ihe gross stock of assets and liabilities of these 
markets is only marginally influenced by the net flows generated in 
a given year by the Ba.lance of Payments of different countries. Even 
if all countries were to be in Balance of Payments equilibrit.m1 from 
now on, one could expect Eurocurrency markets to continue to grow 
as financial intermediary among the various agents participating in 
international trade and finance. 
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While the performance of international banks as financial in-
-:ten-;}2diaries during 1973-80 was remarkably good, present arrangements 
remain historically anoma.lous and vulnerable in several ways. 
Besides the contrasts already noted between new and old capital 
exporters, consider the following points: 
a) The level of OPEC capital exports depends heavily on the 
real price of oil, rather than on stable long-term saving and investment 
propensities. I:Xlring 1974 through 1977 OPF.C surpluses were large, 
but tending tDdecrease until 1978, when they practically disappeared; 
in 1979 they rose sharply once again. For sane importers of both oil 
and capital it is unclear whether the inflows are adding to productive 
capacity or simply maintaining consumption above levels sustainable 
in the long run (assuming the persistence of high real energy prices). 
Contrary to much historical experience in the periphery, worsening 
tenns of trade accompany the capital inflow. 
b) The 1973-80 recycling was aided by "rroney mirage" in the 
part of capital exporters. Ex-post real yields on dollar--0enorninated 
financial assets were low, certainly lower than the yield of oil in 
the ground. One wonders how long such a nnney mirage can last. Yet 
insistence by capital exporters on "normal" positive real rates of 
return on their financial assets would add to the problems of capital 
1mporters. 
c) Political relations between old and new capital exporters 
are far from harroonious. Tensions between Iran and the USA, leading 
to the freeze in 1979 of Iranian assets 1n US-owned banks, had important 
negative repercussions in the syndicated Eurocurrency market. catastrophic 
scenarios are much too easily imagined. 
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Tne historical anOl;'ialies raised by the emerp;ence o~ O?EC as 
the major capital exporter deserve closer empirical scrutiny. The 
next section presents structural features of international financial 
nows and stocks since 1973, emphasizing those of special interest 
to the Periphery. 
N. The 1970s: stylized facts and trends 
'Ihl.s section is organized as follows. Global balance of 
payments patterns are reviewed first, en;>hasizing.LDC and Latin American 
deficits. Recent LDC financing arrangements are discussed and con;:,ared 
with earlier postwar experience. The analysis of financial nows 
leads to a consideration of debt magnitudes and of the burden of debt 
servicing, which are placed 1n historical perspective. A discussion 
of international private banking follows. The section closes with a 
carparative look at official and other lenders. 
A. Global patterns 
The global pattern of current account deficits and surpluses 
since 1973 are surrmarized in Table 1, and are expressed in dollars of 
constant value. It may be seen that net capital flows fluctuated con­
siderably fran year to year; the OPEC surplus was only $4 billion in 
1978 but is expected to reach $71 billion (at 1975 prices) in 1980. 
The average pattern for 1974-80 is likely to continue well into the 
1980s. Indeed, with the indexing of oil prices and roore prudent ;md 
steadier OPEC development plans, the indicated pattern could be more 
stable during the 1980s than it was in the 1970s, when the real OPEC 
surplus declined sharply between 1974 and 1978. Both the OPEC surplus 
and the LDC deficit can be called structural in the sense that neither could 
be eliminated within a reasonabie t:1me span just by changes in exchange 
rates and macroeconomic policies. 
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TABLE 1 
Global Patterns of Current Accounts 
(In Billion 
•· 
U.S. dollars at 1975 prices) 
Industrial OPEC Non-oil (Of which Socialist 
Countries LOCs Western countries and 
Hemisphere) errors and 
omissions 
1973 25 9 -16 (-7) -19 
1974 -15 76 -42 (-15) -20 
1975 16 35 -46 (-17) -5 
1976 -2 40 -32 (""."12) -6 
1977 -5 29 -26 (-8) 1 
1978 25 4 -29 (-10) 
1979 -8 48 -39 (-13) -2 
1980 -32 71 -42 (-13) 3 
Average 
1974-80 -3 43 -36 (-13) -4 
Source : Adapted fran Table 11, Appendix C, p. 95, in World Economic outlook; 
A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. 
May 1980. Data in current dollars were deflated by the dollar unit value indices 
for industrial countries exports, as published in International Monetary Fi.md, 
International Financial Statistics. Data for 1980 are rough estimates. 
Negative signs imply deficits 1n current account. 
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Non-oil LOCs ca"1 be expected to be net capital ir.lporters, 
but it is important to exarrJ.ne how the deficits were financed and 
whether the inflow was accompanied by the maintenance of domestic 
savings efforts. Given dollar inflation and economic growth, it is 
also of interest to establish the magnitude of financing needs relative 
to other macroeconomic magnitudes. 
The current account deficits of non-oil Latin American countries 
are presented in Table 2 as a percentage of exports and ~oods and services 
since 1950. These deficits resulted from short term fluctuations as well 
as from the interaction of demand and supply for long term capital. One 
may conjecture that the deficits for 1960-62 (the heyday of the Alliance 
for Progress) and 1970-73, in the order of 22 percent of exports, 
represent reasonable approximations to desired long run capital inflows. 
The low numbers for the 1950s reflect poor supply conditions in world 
capital markets, while the extraordinary deficits for 1974-76 indicate 
special circumstances unlikely to be sustair)able over the long run. 
By 1977-78 the deficit was around 1967-73 levels, but rose again 1n 
1979. 
Two remarks may be ma.de about the relative magnitudes of pre-
and post-1973 Latin American deficits, with conflicting implications regarding 
the sustainability of 1977-79 deficits. The GNP growth rate acccmpanying 
post-1973 deficits was lower than that for 1967-73; the fonner was 
roughly 5 percent per annum 1n contrast with 7 percent for the earlier 
years. 
World inflation, however, is leading to an overestimation 
of the magnitudes of external savings. Under present institutional 
; arrangements the allocation of debt service between interest and 
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TABLE 2 
Current Accou.'1t Deficit of Latin America, excluding oil exporters,














Sources: Computed from data presented in Cuademos Estcrlisticos de la 
Cepal, El Balance de Pagos de America Latina 1960-1977, Naciones Unidas, 
Santiago de Chile 1979, Table 4, and fran revised and updated data 
kindly rre.de available by An<:lrfbs Bianchi, of the Cepal staff. The table 
includes 16 countries; Cuba, the newly-independent Caribbean nations, 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela are excluded. 
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a~o:'tization is distorted in favor of the former by dollar inflation, 
thus increasing the magnitude of cUITent account deficits. A numerical 
exa'Tlple clarifies this question. Suppose that net debt at the end of the 
previous year is $1,000, and that nom1nal amortization remittances this year 
are zero arid the nominal rate of interest is 15 percent per anmrn. 
D::>llar inflation, affecting the debtor country export and import prices, 
is 10 percent per annum. Consequently, the real value of net debt at 
end of this year is $900. Of the $150 interest paid out, $50 is real 
interest and $100 is real debt amortization. Ordinary balance of 
payments accounting registers a $150 outflow in cUITent account and 
a zero outflow in capital account. Inflation-proof accounting should 
register $50 in service payments and $100 in debt amortization, the 
latter being a capital account item. Real domestic savings is $100 
higher and real foreign savings $100 lower than indicated by current 
accounting procedures. In the case of Brazil, for example, it has 
been estimated that using inflation-proof accounting method&,the current 
account deficit for 1978, expressed as a percentage of GDP, is 2.1 
percent instead of the 3.1 percent given by uncorrected data. For 1979, 
101the contrast is even stronger: 2.2 percent versus 4.0 percent. 
Given an investment rate, est:1.ma.tes for domestic saVings would have to 
be adjusted upwards by corresponding percentage points. 
In the Brazilian study just mentioned, innation in the 
United States was used to deflate debt figures. other debt denators 
have been proposed: dollar export prices of the country in question, 
ternlS of trade, and the consumer expenditure denator (adjusted for 
exchange rate changes). ll/ nenating by tern1S of trade is plainly 
wrong; the use of the consumer expenditure deflater is likely to run 
into practical difficulties. The theory of shadow exchange rates and 
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pra~tical considerations strongly sugrest a deflator which is a weig.~ted 
sur:-; of dollar export and import prices, with the weights reflectin's the 
JllaI'f,.i.'1al sha..~s of exports and imports in the adjustment process. 
B. LOC Fina'1cine a.."Ta"1f';ements 
Net financing needs during the 1970s have gone beyond those 
indicated by current account deficits; dollar inflation, real trade 
growth and a more uncertain international environment have led to an 
increase in the demand for reserves. Few LDCs could rely on perfectly 
flexible exchange rates to do away with reserves. Thus, Table 3 includes 
·net reserve accumulation together with current account deficits to 
obta1n net financial needs of all non-oil LDCs, expressed at current 
dollar prices. As measured by traditional indicators, the reserve 
accumulation shown in Table 3 does not appear excessive. For all 
non-oil LDCs gross reserves amounted to 28 percent of imports of goods 
and services dur:1ng 1967-72; this ratio moved down to 21 percent during 
1974-76, recovering to 25 percent during 1977-79 (data source as in 
Table 3). The corresponding figures for non-oil Western Hemisphere 
LOCs give a sanewhat different picture: 22 percent for 1967-72, 
22 percent for 1974-76 and a jtm1p to 33 percent during 1977-79. This 
bulge, however, is being reduced during 1980. Many IDCs contracted debt 
when conditions were favorable during the 1970s, letting reserves as 
well as undisbursed debt nuctuate. 
Table 3 shows that two traditional sources of finance, grants 
and direct foreign investment, reduced their relative contribution 
after 1973. Net long term borrowing fran official sources such as 
the World and regional banks, and from private financial institutions, 
ma.:1nly banks, make up the bulk of the expansion of external finance. 
Bond issues and suppliers' credits fran non-official sources remain 
relatively small contributors of net finance. 
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TABLE 3 
Fina'1cial Sources for all Non-oil LDCs 
(A'1!1ual averwes in current billion dollars) 
1973 1974-75-76 1977-78 1979-80 
Current account deficit 11.3 38.3 32.1 61.5 
Net reserve accumulation 9.7 4.3 15.0 10.0 
21.0 42.6 47.1 71.5 
Net transfers received by governments lj.5 6.8 7.7 10.ll 
Net direct investment ll. 3 5.1 5.8 7.7 
Net long-term borrowing: 
-from official sources 5.5 10.ll 15.3 17.5 
-from f1nancial institutions ll.o 9.1 17.5 16.8 
-from bond issues,net 0.5 0.5 3.1 
-from suppliers' credits o. ll 0.9 1.9 9.8{-other 1.5 3.3 -3.ll 
Net short-term borrowing,other· 
net, and errors and omissions: 0.3 6.5 -0.8 9,3 
Sources: Adapted from Table 19, p.101, in World Econoorl.c Outlook; A Survev by 
the Staff of the International Monetary Fund, May 1980, Washington, D.C. IAita 
for 1979-80 involve rough estimates as well as projections. Data on gross 
reserves relative to imports of goods and services are given in pp.lllarid 9ll 
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These trends are sharper for Latin Ame:-ica, as may be seen 
in Table 4. Grants have been a very minor part of external finance since 
the early 1960s; other fonns of public resources have also undergone 
a decline 1n importance during the 1970s. Private djrect investment, 
which provided nearly one-third of all long-tenn external 
resources during the 1960s, by 1977-78 accounted for little more than 
one-sixth. Prlvate banks and other private financial institutions have 
become the major suppliers of external finance. 
C. Debt accumulation and servicing 
The sunmation of net yearly borrowing nows yields the increase 
in non-OPEC Third World debt. Thus, according to Table 3, long-tenn 
debt to all official and private creditors nust have increased by about 
$141 billion between the end of 1973 and the end of 1978. The surrmation 
of net direct investment flows yields the increment in foreign equity 
in the capital stock located within non-oil LOCs, ignoring capital gains 
and losses; such equity has no predetennined repayment schedule, as debt 
has under present institutional arrangements, although it generates outflows 
of profit remittances, as debt generates interest paymen~s. 
Reported debt figures contain great variety; they .are often 
presented in a manner intE:ni' ?d more to shock than to enlighten. One 
source of discrepancy aroong estimates is whether short-tenn (less than 
one year) debt is or is not included. At any one point there is a large 
float of short-tenn credits to finance LOC imports; such stock grows 
with the increase of trade values, but it can be expected to provide 
little help to financing current account deficits over the long I'U!1· 
Short tenn policy headaches may arise if nonnal corrrnercial credits are 
suddenly curtailed, but this is not what most observers have in mind 
when discussing the "debt problem". Another way in which debt figures can 
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TABIE 4 
Net wng Tenn Inflow of External Resources for Latin America 
(Annual averages 1n current billion dollars) 
1961-65 1966-70 1971-73 1974-76 1977-78 
Net Eublic inflow 1.0 1.1 1.4 2.8 1.7 
Multilateral 0.3 o.4 o.8 1.6 0.9
Bilateral 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.2 o.8 
Net private inflow 0.6 1.6 3.9 9.6 17.0 
Suppliers 0;1 o.4 0.2 0.3 1.6
Financial.institutions 0.3 2.0 6.7 9.9
Bonds 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 2.3
Direct investment o.4 0.9 1.6 2.4 3.2 
Total 1.6 2.6 5.3 12.4 18.8 
Sources: Adapted from Table III-13, p.85, in Inter-American Development Bank,
Economic and Social Progress in Latin America; 1979 Reoort, Washinp;ton, D. C.
"Latin America" includes the Inter-American Bank's developing member countries
in the Western Hemisphere. 
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be inflated iz the inclusion of undisburse-d portions of contracted 
loans. 
A second maj oY' sou...Y>Ce of difference in reported debt figures 
.. 
is whether or not items other tha~ those owed by official LDC borrowers, 
or which are officially guaranteed, are included. Published World Bank 
data, for example, only cover official and officially guaranteed debt. 
Most meditm1 and long-term credits to the Third World would fall under 
this category, but some countries (e.g. Argentina) have large private 
debts not guaranteed by the government. The stmrnation of balance of 
payments data should give net increases in debt, whether or not officially 
guaranteed. 
A third difference comes about from definitions of "net". Suppose 
for example, that all acctmrulated long term borrowing from f~cial 
institutions shown in Table 3 for 1974-78 ($62.3 billion) came fran banks 
which also held the accumulated increase of LOC reserves ( $42. 9 billion) • 
Reported net debt to those banks could then be said to have increased 
only by $19.4 billion. Data on private bank positions vis-a-vis LOCs 
are frequently 11netted" in this fashion. 
Other differences may arise from geographical or other coverages. 
There has been a proliferation of ways of grouping Third World countries, 
even within old geographical units. The IMF has a category of "net 
oil exporters" within the group of "non--011 developing countries", and 
non--0il Western Hemisphere developing countries is not quite the same 
as what used to be meant by Iatin America. Behind these confusions lie 
the growing heterogeneity of the Third Wor],.d. Aggregation, especially 
in the area of debt, has only a limited usefulness and can yield mislead~ 
or meaningless numbers. 
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Tne total outsta~ding public and publicly guara~teed long term 
external debt of all non-oil developing countries rose from $76 billion 
at the end of 1973 to $212 billion at the end of 1978, an increase 
in line with the data of Table 3. The IMF, in the publication cited 
1n that Table, also estimates a debt of $280 billion for the end of 
1980. 'Ihe corresponding figures for non-oil Western Hemisphere 
developing coU17,tries are $26 billion for 1973, $83 billion for 1978, 
and $104 billion for 1980. It is est1mated that about half of the 
debt of all non-oil :r..ocs is owed to private creditors; for the debt 
of non-oil Western Hemisphere developing countries the corresponding 
figure is higher, sanewhat less than two-thirds. 
Debt has grown, but so have price levels, exports, and 
production. Table 5 expresses the stock of deb.t as a percentage of 
LOC output and exports. Viewed in this light, the growth of LOC 
debt appears significant but less terrifying. For all non-oil LOCs 
debt has risen relative to Gross Domestic Product between 1973-74 and 
1979-80; relative to exports of goods and services it rose between 
1973-74 and 1977-78, and declined after that. Latin American in­
debtedness is above the average for the Third World, and on the whole 
rose faster during the 1970s. The last column of Table 5 shows debt 
relative to merchandise e~ports for non-oil Western Hemisphere 
developing countries; it indicates a sharp rise between 1974 and 1978, 
but a steep decline after that year. In short, Table 5 serves to 
emphasize the obvious (but often forgotten) point that so long as 
output and exports continue to expand pari oassu with debt, the 
servicing of the latter should not ge,nerate rna,jor anxieties. It may 
be noted that around 1910 the Argentine public external debt aroounted 
to 184 percent of its merchandise exports, a figure higher than any 
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TABLE 5 
Public and Publicly Guaranteed External Debt 
As a Percentage of Gross Product As a Percentage of Exports 














1960 n.a. n.a. 11 n.a. n.a. 
1970 n.a. n.a. 14 n.a. n.a. 
1973 14 11 17 70 61 
1974 13 10 18 64 55 
1975· 15 12 19 76 62 
1976 16 12 23 78 61 
1977 18 13 25 82 61 
1978 19 14 28 86 63 
1979 19 13 n.a. 80 57 
1980 19 lll n.a. 7l! 53 
n.a. = Means data are not available. 
Sources: Data for 1973 thro~..h 1980 comes from Table 23, Appendix C, p.103 
in World Economic Outlook; A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary 
Fund, Washington, D.C., May 1980. "Gross Productn refers to Gross Domestic 
Product. Data for 1960 through 1978 comes from Table III-23., p.97, in 
Inter-American Development Bank., Econanic and Social Progress in Latin America; 
1979 Report, Washington, D.C. "Gross Product" refers to Gross National Product. 
"Latin America" includes the Inter-American Bank's developing member countries 
in the Western Hemisphere. The last column is canputed from data in the 
World Economic Outlook, ~ cit, pp. 99 and 102 
-26-
reGistered in the last column of Table 5.121 
Interest plus amortization payments are presented. in Table 6 
as percentages of exports. This measure of the debt burden will 
increase as debt maturity shortens; if all debt were made up of consols, 
only interest would be included in the servicing, but if all loans had 
to be renewed yearly,annual service would cover the whole debt plus 
interest. The statistic for the debt service ratio will be interpreted 
differently depending on what 1s assumed regarding the automaticity 
of the roll-over process. Table 6 shows a sharp increase in this 
statistic for Latin American countries between 1974 and 1978; for other 
LOCs the increase is smaller. 
A longer and broader perspective on the burden to Latin America 
of servicing all accumulated capital inflows is presented in Table 7. 
Latin America came out of the 1930s and 1940s with little debt and sane 
direct foreign investment. Pre-1929 debts and foreign investment were 
sharply reduced relative to GNP and exports by defaults, renegotiations,nation­
eliZ<i.tions,inflation and war-induced European liquidations. During 1950-51' profit 
remittances by direct foreign investors exceeded debt service charges. 
Since then the latter have expanded steadily, even as a fraction of 
exports of goods and services. Profit remittances also tended to grow 
relative to exports until 1965-69; since then it has undergone a little-
noticed but 1mportant decline. In 1974-76 profit remittances represented 
a lower percentage of exports of goods and services than during 1950-51'; 
during 1977-79 that percentage rose again, but remained below 1970-73 levels. 
As noted earlier, dollar inflation, under present institutional 
~ements, increases interest payments relative to amortization in 
the servicing of a given loan. Inflation may also shorten the average 
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TABU: 6 
Service Payments on Public and Publicly Guaranteed External 
Debt as Percentages of Exports of Goc<ls and Services 
All non- Maj or UX:: exporters Principal Debtor Rest of 
oil LOCs of manufactures Countries in Latin America 
Latin America 
1961-65 n.a. n.a. 15 5 
1966-70 n.a. n.a. 16 6 
1971-75 n.a. n.• a. 15 7 
1973 9 8 15 8 
1974 7 7 12 7 
1975 9 8 16 6 
1976 9 7 18 7 
1977 10 8 22 7 
1978 11 9 30 15 
1979 11 9 n.a. n.a. 
1980 11 8 n.a. n.a. 
n.a.=Means data are not available 
Sources: Data for 1973 through 1980 comes from Table 25, Appendix C, p.104, 
in World Economic Outlook, op cit. Data in the last two columns comes frcm 
Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 9£. cit., Table III-26, p.101. 
"Principal Debtor Countries" are Argen't1na, Brazil, Colornbia, Chile, Mexico, 
Peru and Venezuela. Service payments include interest and amortization. 
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TA5LS 7 
Net Fina'1cic.l Service Charges of Latin America, Excluding Oil 
Exporters, relative to Exports of Goods a11d Services 
(Percentages) 
Period Interests Profits Interests plus Amortizati9ns 
Profits 
1950-54 1.3 5.9 7.2 2.8 
1955-59 2.3 5.2 7.5 7.2 
1960-64 4.0 6.5 10.5 10.9 
1965-69 5.5 8.8 14.J 13.7 
1970-73 7.4 7.1 14.5 17.2 
1974-76 11.1 5.5 16.6 19.1 
1977-79 12.0 6.8 18.9 28.1~-
~ refers to 1977-78 only. 
Sources: As in Table 2. "Profits" include earnings of foreign direct 
investments net of truces, whether remitted abroad or reinvested domestically 
(see p.5 of the source listed in Table 2). Interests and profits received 
by Latin American residents are netted from the payments made under these 
rubrics. For example, interest earned by La.tin American Central Banks 
on their holdings of international reserves are deducted fran interest 
payments on the external debt. Amortizations cover those for both private 
and public debt of more than one year; however, data on amortizations of 
private debt not officially guaranteed are shaky for most countries. 
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maturity o:' all dett; that average maturity will also incre2.se as 
a result of a greater share of borrowing from private sources. Both 
of these factors cari increase am::>rtizations relative to both e:xports 
and interest payments. Table 7 indicates a decline in amortizations 
relative to interest payments from 1955-59 until 1974-76; in the 
most recent years this trend was reversed. 
The sum of interests and profits as a percentage of exports 
shoi'm in Table 7 may be canpared to those of "countries of recent 
settlement" before the Great Depression. During 1900-14 the corres­
ponding figures were 39 percent for Argentina, 22 percent for Australia 
and 24 percent for Canada. I:uring 1921-29 these three countries had 
s1m1lar ratios: 19 percent for Argentina, 21 percent for Australia 
and 19 percent for Canada. All of these historical percentages 
refer to interest and profits relative to merchandise exports (whose 
statistics are more ccmparable). For the countries shown in Table 7 
merchandise exports were about 82 percent of exports of goods and 
services. Even after adjusting for this fact, the interest and profit 
share in exports shown in Table 7 for 1977-79 is roughly comparable 
to those of pre-1929 "countries of recent settlement. 11131 
D. Private Banking 
Private banks owned mainly by residents of industrialized 
countries proved to be the most dynamic agents in international capital 
markets during 1973-80. Those banks may be located in the country 
owning them, lending in their own currency, or they may be located offshore, 
lending in other currencies. The close interconnection among major national 
and international financial centers makes the distinction of only limited 
economic interest, although important for the implementation of possible 
controls and for jurisdictional disputes. Most of the banks engaged in 
international lending now report to the Bank for International Settlements 
(BI~); by the end of 1978 their accumulated lendinr; a~d borrowing 
operations were as surrrnarized 1n Table 8. Claims include loans of all 
maturities and to public and private agents. Tne importance of major 
oil exporting countries (mainly OPEC) and other developing countries 
for international banking is readily apparent. 
BIS reports also show the concentration of bank lending to 
a few countries. Just Brazil and Mexico accounted for roore than one 
third of the b~s' claims on non-oil LDCs at the end of 1978. other 
important LDC borrowers include Liberia, South Korea, Peru, Argentina, 
F.cuador and the Phillipines. On the other hand, a large number of 
LOCs, including among.them those with very low per capita incanes, are 
net creditors of the international banks, i.e., their reserves deposited 
with those banks exceed the loans received. Note the low net positions 
of other Asia and other Africa 1n Table 8. International banking has 
no m:>re regard for interregional or interpersonal equity than national 
banking does. 
'Ille credit provided by banks is ~tm1-tenn, that 1s, 7 years 
or so. Technically, credits are renewed every six roonths but the bank is 
contnitted for the full seven years; no cases are known where the six 
roonth "roll-over" has been denied (unless there has been a default). 
Typically, interest is adjusted every six months; the borrower is 
corrrnitted to pay the nuctuating London inter-bank offered rate (LIBOR~ 
plus a margin, the "spread", usually fixed for the full life of the loan. 
Some credits provide for an increase in spreads during the latter years 
of the loan to compensate for longer maturities and to allow for 
inflation. Eurocredits to LDCs have been provided almost totally in 
dollars. Besides LIBOR and spreads, the borrower pays management and 
ccmnitment fees; some loan agreements also require borrowers to maintain 




International B9...'1ks Outsta~d.inp: Stock of Cla:1ms and Liabilities 
(Billion current U.S. dollars) 
December 1979 Net Position 
Claims Liabilities Net December December 
Position 1978 1977 
"Group of 
Fourteen'' 588 686 -98 -67 -59 
other 
Industrialized 
Countries 73 47 26 26 27 
Offshore 
Banking Centers 156 139 16 27 27 
Ea.stem Europe 56 15 41 37 30 
Oil-exporting 
Countries 64 120 -56 -26 -39 
Non-oil LOCs 159 90 69 45 37 
-Latin America (104) (38) (65) (47) (41) 
-Middle Fast (8) (16) (-8) (-7) (-5) 
-other Asia (33) (27) (7) (2) 
-other Africa (14) (9) (5) (4) 
Unallocated 16 23 -7 -5 -6 
Total 1,111 1,120 -10 36 18 
Source: Adapted from Fiftieth Annual Report, Bank for International Settlements, 
Ba.sle, June 1980, p. 119. "Group of Fourteen" includes the better known Group of 
Ten plus Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Ireland. other industrialized countries 
includes Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and other countries 1n Western Europe. 
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Sane indicators of lending conditions at the Eurocurrency 
market a.-ne presented in Table 9. It may be seen that LIBOR, the spreads, 
and the maturities nuctuate considerably fran year to year. At any 
one time the spreads can be quite different as between countries and 
among borrowers or the same country. At mid-1977 the following spreads 
were reported for sovereign borrowers:151 








The criteria used to establish these differences are not 
transparent. With the wisdan of hindsight one can spot anomalies: 
note the contrast between the figures given for Iran and Peru, and that 
between the rnid-1977 spreads for Mexico arid late 1980 reports that 
PEMEX is borrowing at 0.25 above LIBOR, the lowest margin known to have 
been granted on a syndicated loan.161 Unpublished attempts to statistically 
explain differences in spreads across countries suggest that they increase 
with the ratio of debt to gross national product, and decline the higher 
the per capita inccme of the borrower.171 Besides country-specific 
characteristics, spreads seem influenced by general conditions, including 
such intangibles as "market confidence", as during 1974-75. 'lbese issues 
require further detailed work. 
Data on fees are nr::>re difficult to obtain than for spreads. 
Management fees are usually a flat percentage of the loan, ranging fran 0.375 
to 0.75 percent, paid only at the t:1me the credit a.rTangement is signed. 
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TABLE 9 
Indicators of Lending Conditions at the Eurocurrency Market 
(Percentages except for maturities) 
Spreads Maturities(ronths) 
Prjj-oe
Year LIBOR France All LDCs Brazil Borrowers Brazil 
1974 . 11.32 0.58 1.13 1.2#" 96 11~ 
1975 7.74 1.42 1.68 1.70 66 75 
1976 6.26 1.09 l.72 1.91 69 70 
1977 6.54 0.92 1.55 1.96 80 68 
1978 9.48 o.63 1.20 1.59 101 85 
1979 12.12 0.36 0.87 1.16?! 108 111£1 
a/ refers to the last three quarters of the year only. 
b/ refers to the first half of the year only. 
Sources: First three coltm11s obtained from the World Banlc, World. Development 
Report, 1980, Washington D.C., August 1980, p.27. Brazilian data obtained 
t'.ran Paulo Nogueira Baptista Jr., "D1v1da extema braslleira", Conjuntura 
Econctnica, April 1980, volmne 3Lt, number 4, pp. 86-92. Data on "prime 
borrowers" obtained from Kengo Inoue, "Determinants of market conditions in 
the eurocurrency imrket; why a "borrowers" market?", BIS Working Papers, 
Number 1, April 1980, Table 1. Spreads exclude fees. 
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Besides this "front-end" fee, borrowers usually are contnitted to pay 
a facility fee at an annual rate on undrawn portions of a credit; 
this may range between 0.25 and 0.75 percent. It is said that sOOE 
borrowers trade off higher.front-end fees for lower spreads, for the 
sake of prestige. 
Neither spreads nor fees, however, bear the full brunt of 
rationing credJJ; banks prefer to discourage or limit sane potential 
borrowers rather than charge them unusually high spreads or fees. Credit 
rationing can be explained even for danestic markets as a result of 
asynmetric infonna.tion ~tween creditors and debtors. If only interest 
rates were used to allocate credit, those intending to default (expecting 
to get around legal penalties) would borrow as nuch as possible 
regardless of interest rates; this is the adverse selection market 
inperfection. Banks try to protect themselves against dishonest borrowers 
both by investigating all custaners and by limiting exposure to any one 
of them. In international lending adverse selection is canpotmded by 
sovereign or country risk, because national bankruptcy laws and 
penalties do not apply.17bis/ 
Even with the addition of fees, the charges shown in Table 9 
appear ex-post quite attractive for average~ borrowers, bearing 1n 
mind that dollar unit values for non-oil~ exports rose during 
1972-80 at an average annual rate of nearly 15 percent, while those 
for LOC imports rose at m:>re than 16 percent per annum.181 One should 
note, however, that the price increases were highly irregular from 
year to year, and across conmodities and countries. Yet these ex-post 
results compare quite favorably with interest charges of around 5 percent 
on the Argentine external debt of 1900-1~, at a time when international 
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in:'latio:-: averar.:ej les::: than 2 percent per a'1.11um. Tne ex-oost avera.p;e 
bor70Kll1£; costs for 1973-80 also compa..-ne favorably with reasonable 
estimates for the real return to investment in LOCs. 
As noted earlier, about two-thirds of non-oil Western Hern.isphere 
developing countries is owed to private creditors, mainly banks, which 
is subject to service charges and conditions similar to those described 
in Table 9 and in previous paragraphs. It is not surprisin.P; that in 
those countries· fluctuations in LIBOR and spreads have joined variations 
in the prices for oil and export staples as front page news. LIBOR 
fluctuations are followed by sane r...oc m::metary authorities for another 
reason: a good share of their international reserves are deposited in 
international banks paying interest around LIOOR. For those countries the 
cost of holding reserves is thus approximately given by spreads. Given the 
secrecy surrounding reserve management, 1t is not known how man,y countries 
follow such relatively bold policy. 
Ten banks are said to have arranged half of all publicized 
Eurocredits in 1976 and 1977, providing about one~uarter of the money 
themselves; 20 banks arranged two-thirds of the total while providing 
191one-third of the money. S1m1lar estimates for all international 
bank lending are not available. During 1978 and 1979 contradictory 
trends influenced the ccxnpetitiveness of international banking. The 
freeze of Iranian assets deposited in U.S.-owned banks (regardless of 
banks' location) decreed by the U.S. government, and the resulting 
legal canplications frightened smaller banks away from international 
lending. Rivalry among banks of different nationalities increased, 
however. There was a sharp rise 1n the market share of banks not owned 
by U.S. residents,as may be seen 1n Table 10. For the five Latin 
American countries shown in Table 10, U.S. banks provided only 11 percent 
-36-
TABU: 10 
Sane Outstanding International Claims of Banks Reoorting to the BIS 
(Billion Current U.S. dollars) 
December 1977 























LDCs 137.9 71.1 
-World total 
excluding 
claims on the 









































Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Federal Reserve 
Bulletin, Table 3.20, issues beginning June 1979; and BIS, reports on 
international banking. 
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of the net increase :tr: le;1d:inz ·between Decerber 1977 and Ju.-ie 1979. 
For all LDCs, including oil-exporters, the corresponding sra:re is 
sanewhat srraller (near 10 percent). Japanese and Italian banks are 
reported to have experienced an acceleration in their international 
lending; French, Dutch, Swiss, Canadian, British and German banks a.."'€ 
also expanding their lending to LDCs. OPEC has been exploring the 
financial linkages generated by its staple; banks owned by major oil-
.. 
producing nations appear to be expanding fast. Following its demands 
for more of a share 1n refining oil, OPEC strives now to do roore of 
the "refining" of its petrodollars. 201 Even banks owned by non-oil LDC 
residents appear to have increased their 1nternational activities. 
On the whole, 1nternat1onal banking has remained fairly com-
petititive. The number of actors on both sides of the market is not. 
very large, so there is a considerable presence of "customer relation­
ships" between banks and countries. But actual and potential new 
entrants hovering at the fringes of this market have at least provoked 
ccmplaints from international bankers that canpetition is excessive. 
E. Other Lenders 
Important shares of the debt of non-oil Western Hemisphere 
LDCs are still held by foreign governments and international lending 
agencies, as well as by private creditors other than financial institutions. 
The fonner debt averages nnre favorable servicing conditions, i.e., 
longer maturities and lower and fixed interest rates. Other private 
creditors include bondholders and others who lent at fixed 1nterest 
rates. 
It was seen earlier that even floating 1nterest rates did 
not on average keep up with inflation during the 1970s. Beyond this, 
debt negotiated at fixed interest rates before international 1nflationary 
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e)'.Tlectatior.s becar:ie widespread (say before 197~) gene~ated c~"Jit2.l gair.:::. 
for borrowers. About 45 percent of non-oil Western Hemisphere debt was 
to o~ficial creditors at the end of 1973. Countries like Colanbia obtained 
sig;nifica.~t benefits from a debt structure heavy with fixed-interest 
obligations. On the other hand, a sha.~ of such debt was negotiated. in 
currencies other than U.S. dollars; effective interest rates will be 
influenced by fluctuations in, say, dollar/Deutsche Mark exchange rates. 
Assuming both purchasing power and interest rate parities to hold between 
the U.S. and Germany over the long run will not lessen short-and~um 
tenn uncertainties regardinp; debt service magnitudes. 
Average interest and amortization charges for a given country 
will then depend on the exact mix of debt which is old and new, public 
and private. Average debt maturity could ~horten even as Eurocurrency 
loans to a country extend theirs. A rough idea of average interest 
and maturity conditions for the whole debt of non-oil Western Hemisphere 
countries and Brazil may be obtained comparing interest and amortization 
payments to the stock of outstanding debt. This is done in Table 11. 
For Latin America as a group, the average interest charges of Table 11 
are of course more favorable than those shown in Table 9. 
We have shown that during 1973-80 as a whole average interest 
rates on the Latin American debt were no higher than plausible estimates 
for annual increases in <;Iollar prices for the region's exports and 
imports. This indicates that inflation-proof accounting would include at 
least all registered interest payments in the capital account of the 
balance of payments as amortizations. Excluding all interest payments 
from the current accolll'lt would yield the followinp; estimates of the 
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TABLE 11 
Average Conditions of Official a.~d Officially Guara~teed Debt 
Interest (percentages) Amortization Payments
as Percentages of Debt 
Non-oil
Western
Year Hemis2here Brazil Non-oil Western Hemis2here 
1974 6.6 10.4 12.1
1975 6.7 12.0 9.9 -
1976 6.2 9.9 10.9
1977 6.1 9.0 13.2
1978 7.1 10.1 15.2
1979 7.6 13.3 13.6 
Sources and Definitions: Average interest is the ratio of all interest
payments in a given year to debt outstanding at the end of the previous
year, expressed as a percentage. A similar calculation is made for
amortization payments. Non-oil Western Hemisphere data obtained from the
World Bank debt reporting system and the IMF; Brazilian data from
Paulo Nogueira Baptista Jr., op cit.; p.91 
deficit of non-oil Latin America as percentages of goods a11d se~ices 
(figures in parentheses reproduce the corresponding estimates of Table 2): 
1973: 10 (17 percent) 
1974: 36 (44 percent) 
1975: 40 (52 percent) 
1976: 18 (30 percent) 
1977: 6 (18 percent) 
1978: 7 (20 percent) 
1979: 16 (27 percent) 
The nature and conditions of loans from multilateral official 
sources have also 
.· 
evolved during the 1970s, although more slowly than those 
from private sources. The world and regional banks have devised new forms 
of associating their loans to private capital, whether from.banks or 
private direct investors. In politically-sensitive areas, such as energy 
and mineral projects, this association is likely to grow in the future. 
'!be World Ban1c can be expected to rove toward program lending, perhaps 
in canbination w1th the IMF. 'lbese trends respond to pressiFes on the 
international financial system generated not only by OPEC but also by 
changes 1n barga.1n1ng power between LDCs and foreign investors. We 
now turn to exarn1.nation of sane of these systemic issues. 
V. Systemic Issues for the 1980s 
'!he expansion of international capital markets, the adoption 
of floating exchange rates and the macroeconcmic difficulties of many 
.industrialized cotmtries have encouraged the reexamination of academic 
and practical orthodoxies, as well as sane Southern heterodoxies. Already 
during the late 1950s Northern academic centers witnessed a rebirth of 
interest 1n monetary and financial topics. Northern macroeconomic and 
monetary theories underwent sharp debates during the 1960s, leading 
to a surge of neaoonetarist and neoclassical positions in the 1970s. 
It would be difficult to talk about a ronolithic Northern academic or 
even practical orthodoxy on such issues as the desirability of flexible 
excha.rise rates, optirrum controls over capital roovements, the correct 
strategy to cOOJbat inflation, the necessity of regulation over the Euro­
currency market, or indeed over national banking systems. In these matters 
there is a "great disorder under heaven". Under these circumstances one 
may hear Raul Prebisch castigate the evils of international inflation 
with greater vigor than James 'Ibbin, and find that Robert Mundell defends 
fixed exchange rates with greater ardor than Antonio Delfim Netto. Many 
Northern econanists discuss both inflation and balance of payments deficits 
using structural approaches s1m11ar to those emanating fran La.tin America 
during the 1950s. SUpply-side economics are invoked in favoring more 
conservative policies within the North, and in favoring -easier IMF lending 
conditions for LDC borrowers. At a roore practical level it is not unusual 
to find Southern exporters together with Northern bankers, "WOrried about 
debt service, s1ng1.ng the praises of freer world trade, while Northern 
trade unionists, together with their "progressive" academic advisers, 
rediscover all sorts of heterodox arguments for protection. 
This section, after restating the major advantages which inter­
national financial markets of the 1970s offered sane peripheral cotmtries, 
will evaluate criticisms and naws 1n those markets. 'lbose critical 
evaluations can be subdivided according to whether they are made indepen­
dently of the second OPE.c shock of 1979-80, or whether they now fran 
that price increase and accanpany1ng circumstances. 'Ihe section will 
then sketch sane scenarios and proposals to refonn financial markets in 
the 1980s, and will discuss the dilenmas they present for major Ire 
borrowers. 
'1he atrocurrency market and international bank lerrling during 
the 1970s displayed a m1nber of features which canpare favorably with 
earlier capital market arrangements rran the viewpoint of at least sane 
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1mportant semi1ndustrial1zed countries, as well as several social.1st cou.~tries. 
Probably no :international capital market in history has had a lower degree 
of political interference to the dismay of "strategic mirrls" like Dr. Henry 
Kissinger. As already noted, competition am::>ng banks has been keen and 
ex ~ interest rates and charges do not seem tmreasonable. At the same 
t~ one should note that private bankers have had their enterprise and 
risk-taking rewarded; their businesses have expanded and so far no one 
has gone bankrupt lending to LOCs. In contra.st with pre-1929 Brazilian 
experience 1n the New York market, members of the "Bogota group", which 
canb1nes major coffee producers, have borrowed freely to finance their 
price stabilization operations. Officials in several semi-in:lustrialized 
countries have been able to ignore IMF advice with:>ut seeing their external 
credit lines dry up. Several oil-bp:>rting Ires were able to avoid 
abrupt and defiationa.ry adjustment to post-1973 circumstances, a type 
of adjustment of doubtful desirability either frail their national or 
an international viewpoint; without the credit resources made available 
by international financial markets this policy option would have been 
less feasible. The 1\mds lent by inten1a.tional banks, in contrast w1th 
those available tll"Xier either concessional finance or suppliers' cred1t5, 
are untied to either goods or countries. The more transparent 11no 
mipackaged nature of bank loans may have reduced frictions and recr1minations 
between debtor and creditor countries. 
Even before the 1979-80 oil price increases, several criticisms 
were levied at private international capital markets. '!he poorest LDCs 
were not regarded as creditworthy, so they received very little of the 
funds made available by international banking. It has also been argued 
that private financial markets have a ntlJlber of important gaps, limiting 
their usefulness even to sem1-1ndustrialized countries. 211 It is true 
that one cannot expect private banJr...s to depart far fran behavior dictated 
by profit maximization under limited ri.sk-taking and short t1me horizons 
so, particularly un:ier conditions of persistent and erratic inflation in 
the central currency in international payments, the maturity transformation 
the banks can be expected to perfonn will be limited. Under these circum­
stances, long-tenn investments have been financed with short- or mediun­
tenn credits, which are rolled over, a far fran ideal arrangement. 
AB Fllrocurrency banks can create credit by the beep of a cauputer, 
and as they are not subject to official reserve requirements, fears of 
explosive credit multipliers originating in those banks were orten 
expressed during the 1970s. Closer analysis has shown that leaks t'ran 
&lrocurrency markets to national credit systems sharply limit their aggregate 
credit-creating potential, especially when major Central Banks abstain 
fran depositing their reserves with Eurocurrency banks, as has been the 
case for several years. '!he Eurocurrency market can be said to have 
increased the efficiency of worldwide financial intennediation, so that 
by making possible a m:>re efficient use of a given world JOOnetary base 
it does add to inteIT1B.tional liquidity. But it is now generally con-
cluded that estimates of world mney supply with or without a Eurocurrency 
market would differ only by a few percentage points; therefore, proposals 
for macroeconanic controls over bank lending such as a universal reserve 
requirement have been recently downplayed.221 
Financial panics during the 1930s led many industrialized 
countries, notably the United states, to insure depositors against the 
consequences of bank failures. 'Ihis policy a.1med at avoiding the chain­
effects of nms on banks, and consequent credit collapses. National 
central banks, as ultimate insurers of deposits and as lenders of last 
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resort, 1n turn dema."lded to inspect and regulate the lending activities 
of private banks. This IM.de good sense, as private banks would otherwise have 
tended to undertake &xcessive risks,resting on the security provided by 
the new policies. 'fue a1m was to make the financial system less prone to 
massive failures while maintaining discipline and lending standards, or 
what 1n the literature is known as limiting the problem of ''mral hazard" 
intrinsic in any insurance scheme. Sane observers have argued that inter­
national banks have tended to be careless in making loans to IDCs, 
encouraged by explicit or inplicit insurance or Northern govemnents for 
their depositors and for their politically-1nportant borrowers; this calls in 
their view for greater regulation of the lending practices of those banks. 
Note that this alleged market failure offsets (whether partly or ioore than 
fully is JOOOt) lending restrictions generated by the adverse selection 
and country risk problems. It is debatable whether the U.S. government 
is less likely to appear insuring the bank debts of Chrysler Corporation 
than or 'furkey or South Korea, but these critics note that the supervision 
over Eurocurrency lending has been less than that exercised over danestic 
lending. Other glocrnier critics argue that while banks' overconfident 
perceptions have indeed led to overlending, the intema.tional camnm.1.ty 
does not in fact have very clear and explicit rules about who should act 
as lender of last resort at times of acute financial stress, and such a 
situation could lead to a major financial crash. 
Discussions of 1nperfections 1n international financial markets, 
flaws which in sane cases favored LDC borrowers, had becane attenuated 
shortly before the 1979-80 oil price increases. Although the new current 
account deficits foreseen for non-oil LJXs are lower relative to their 
GNPs or exports than those of 1974-75, they cane on top of significant 
debt accl.ll1Ulat1oo and at a time of less favorable growth prospects 
danestically and abroad, so there has been renewed anxieties.about 
financial markets. '!he outlook ror the early 1980s depends on a few 
crucial variablesJ which can be discussed with the help of a now rood.el 
sketched in Figure 2J focus:1/lg on the interactions of GNP (or GNP growth)J 
current account positionsJ and the preferences or international financial 
1ntennediaries. 
Asstme the world 1s divided into three regions: OP.EC, OECD.t 
and non-OP.EC LDCs. Asst1ne further that OP.EC GNP (or its growth) 1s 
exogenously given by the developnent plans of those countries, and that 
the real oil price 1s also given. 'lhe OPF.C current account surplus (OA) 
will then depend on non-OPEC GNP (or its growth, fran now on denoted 
as Y), arxi its canpositia, between LDC Y and OF.cD Y. 
'lhe negatively sloping l1ne YY' gives the OP.EC surplus 
corresponding to a given non-OPEC Y; if oil requirements per unit of 
Y were equal 1n I.DCs and OECD the line would be vertical. For each 
non-OP.EC Y there will be a different line YY.. '1he vertical axis 
gives I.re Y relative to OECD Y; as this ratio increases (maintaining 
constant their weighted sum to yield a given non-OPEC Y) it is assumed 
that the OPEC surplus will decline, i.e., that there is a greater use 
of oil per unit of Y in OECD than 1n LDCs. 
'!he positively sloping lines 1n the diagram show the LDC 
current account deficit. 'lbe difference between those two lines represents 
the LDC deficit with OPEC. 'Ihe LDC deficit with OECD is assumed to 
depend solely on the ratio or LDC Y to OF.CD Y. '!he IDC deficit with OPEC 
will increase as LDC Y increases, so the total LDC deficit will ·surely increase 
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FIGURE 2 
during the time span relevant for our analysis adjustment mechanisms 
other than chariges 1n Y can do little to affect the structure of world 
current accotmt deficits and surpluses. 
Consider first a borderline situation when the OPEC surplus OA 
is exactly matched by an UlC overall deficit of equal arrount, ma.de up of 
an UlC deficit with OECD of OB and an LDC deficit with OPEC of BA.. OE'::D 
then has a defic_~t with OPEC of OB. Supposing that all capital nx>vements 
are handled by international financial intennediaries (1.e. , assume away 
grants, direct investnents etc.), those institutions will witness an 
increase in their net claims on non-OPEC LOCs equal to OA, matched by 
increased OPEC claims on the intennediaries. 
Consider now a situation when after several years of accllllUlating 
claims on LOCs, the f.inancial intennediaries decide that it would be 
"1TJ¥)rudent" to maintain the same rate of accumulation. A possible outcane, 
for a given non-OPEC Y, would be a reduction in Ire Y and an increase 
in OECD Y, fran OZ to OW. In the new situation financial intermediaries 
would reduce their accumulation of LDC debts to OE, while accumulating 
nx>re reliable O:ECD paper at a rate of ED. The OECD will becane a 
capital inporter. A more likely possibility avoiding an increase in 
the OPEC surplus would involve both a reduction of non-OPEC Y (leading 
to a shift of YY to the left) and a reduction of UX:: Y relative to OECD 
Y. 
For a given non-OPEC Y, an increase in the real price of oil 
would be depicted in Figure 2 by a shift to the right of YY.' • An 
opposite shift would result fran an increase in the development plans of 
OPEC. Neither an increase in oil prices nor in OPEC Y would shift the 
line showing the I.DC deficit with OECD, but would of course shift (to 
the right for oil price increases, to the left for OPEC Y increase) the 
~B­
line showing the overall I.IX: deficit, reflecting changes in the bala'1ce 
of paym:mts between LOCs and OPEC. The shifts in the line depicting 
the overall LOC deficit would be horizontally smaller than the YY' shirts. 
More vigorous conservation policies would shift YY' to the 
left; its slope will change ·if those efforts are proportionally different 
1n UX::s and OECD. IOC conservation efforts would also be reflected in 
a leftward shift in the line indicating its total current account deficit. 
'!he discussion centered on Figure 2 has said nothing so far 
about the price at which finance is extended. International credit 
conditions will be detennined by the market sketched in Figure 1, where 
stocks of financial assets and liabilities, not Just annual flows, are 
taken into account. One of the major uncertainties for LOC borrowers 
looking at the 1980s is whether the low or even negative real rates of 
interest prevailing during the 1970s will continue. Long-tenn theories 
of interest rates would indicate that the 1970s situation was ancmalous, 
the result of unexpected inflation. 'lhl.s view is strengthened by 
noting that OPF.c countries will prefer to leave appreciating oil under­
ground tmless they can obtain similar rates of return on their financial 
investments. OPF.c calculations plus a desire to control inflation, 
to check balance of payments deficits, and to maintain the position 
of the dollar as the daninant international currency would induce the 
United States to follow tighter credit policies 1n the 1980s. Given a 
high degree of international capital mobility, all major ir.dustrialized 
countries would follow sim1lar policies; indeed, some 'or them already 
did during the 1970s. Up until recently most I.DC borrowing was denanina.ted 
in dollars; had it been denan1nated 1n Oennan marks !!. ~ real interest 
rates would have been higher. The argwnent is that during the 1980s 
I.re borrowing conditions will tighten partly because more of the borrowing 
will be denan1nated in marks and other hard currencies, am partly because 
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u.S. nnnetary policy will be ioore to the liking of Arabs and Germans. 
Finally, Chinese borrowing during the 1980s could add substantial demand 
pressure on financial markets. 
Perhaps. Negative real rates of interest, especially after 
tax, have nenaged to last in· ma.'1Y countries for long periods. Macro­
econom:tc disturbances may call for negative interest rates as part of the 
adjustment mechanism, contrary to long run considerations; such ma.cro­
econanic short-rans, put back to back, can stretch out for many years. 
8cm:! of those mak1ng OPEC productiai decisions may be ma.ximizing family 
wealth placed 1n !Dndon or Zurich rather than their countries' social 
wealth. Political considerations will place lower as well·as upper 
bounds on oil production; consider the faroous scenario 1n which low 
returns cm financial surpluses induces OPF.c to cut oil output, leading 
to price increases Which, g1ven inelastic demand, raise investible 
t'"inancial surpluses, mtivating further production cutbacks and so on. 
It is unlikely that suchtf'c.etonnement could proceed very far with:>ut 
political repercussions. 
<xi balance there is a presl..lllption that real interest rates 
during the 1980s will be higher than during the 1970s, but as with other 
variables, the uncertainty regarding such forecast is high. 
Higher spreads over prime rates for LDC borrowers are also 
foreseen by sane. The argument is that maJor international banks have 
already allocated what they, or their regulators, regard as a high share 
of their portfolio to LOC debt, so any further increase (if forthcom1ng 
at all) has to be canpensated by higher rewards for risk-taking. IAlring 
1979-80 the financial press and sane authorities have called attention 
to deteriorating capital-asset ratios of banks engaged in international 
lending. Typically, it is concluded that higher spreads and profit 
margins are needed to expand banking capital. 
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The considerations appear to assume that entry of new banks 
into international lending is slo...-, and that banking capital cannot grow 
by other means than the reinvestment of profit. These asst1Dptions are 
debatable. It can also be noted the the microeconanic rationale for 
rigid rules-of-thumb about capital-asset ratios, or ceilings on portfolio 
shares, are obscure at best. In practice U.S. and non-U.S. banks have 
very different ceilings and ratios; even with the U.S. there exist substantial 
differences in the capital-asset ratios of iooney center banks and 
other banks. • In the rapidly changing international banking industry. 
those actors following, or being forced to follow, rigid rules-of-thumb 
are IOOl"e likely.to lose market-shares than to influence spreads decisively. 
·Yet in the short-run considerable inconvenience may be inflicted on sate 
borrowers by the existence of such rules. '!he Managing Director of the IMF', 
in an address during October 1980, warned that prudential regulations or 
balance of payments measures in industrialized countries should avoid 
disrupting international financial interrediation. He also observed that 
there has been no serious decline in average capital ratios for banks in 
major financial centers in recent years; that the share in banks' gross 
external assets represented by loans to non-oil I.res did not rise signi­
ficantly during the last decade (rerna1.n1ng around 17 percent) ; that the 
loan-loss experience 1n lending to LDCs has been as good as or better 
than that on danestic lending; and that the safeguards to the underlying 
stability or the financial system seem today stronger than a decade ago.-
23/ 
The 1980 war between Iraq and Iran has highlighted the wl­
nerability of econoodc forecasts to the delicate political situation 
1n the Middle Fast. A number of JrO'POSals have been accllTlllated 1n 
recent years to increase the
1 
robustness or the international financial 
system to such shocks. The variety 1n motivations and specifics is 
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l~ge ; here it will be enoug.11 to focus on sane proposals which give 
special cause for concern to major LOC borrowers. 
Cne woITisane scenario is suggested by the fact that in 
contrast with, say, internat_ional non-oil camxxtlty markets, nowadays 
market imperfections in the international loan market are discussed 
and perceived m::>re clearly in the North than arrong the major Southern 
borrowing countries. At first sight it is remarkable how sane private 
bankers, arguing that "the market 1s out of (their) control", plead 
for more official lending to LDCs, i.e., seek actions which can take 
business away fran them, and argue 1n favor of greater bureaucratic 
supervision such as a larger IMF role 1n the lend1ng process. Often the 
same bankers will argue that Central Banks should stay out or the foreign 
exchange markets •. One may contrast this puzzle with that generated by 
OPEC exhorting its cust~rs to conserve oil. What they appear to seek 
is a 11rationalization" or lending under IMF planning to reduce "cutthroat" 
canpetition. Note that this has already been achieved for state-sub­
sidized and insured export credits, with OECD countries agreeing to 
guidelines on interest floors, maxinun credit periods and m1n1murn cash 
payments. 'Ihese controlled credits, tied to the sale of each OECD country's 
products are expected by sane observers to grow during the 1980s at a 
faster rate than untied private bank loans. Northern practical and 
academic orthodoxies has suddenly tmearthed all sorts of extema.l.1t1es, 
distortions and market 1n1>erfections to justify increased regulation of 
private financial .flows to non-oil LDCs. OPF.C members w1th the largest 
financial surpluses could be induced to fonn a ~1t1on to regulate world 
capital markets, perhaps under the IMF and World Banlc umbrellas. OPE.c participants 
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would obtain "sound and remunerative financial assets" while Northern 
private banks would enjoy "orderly market conditions" 1n which higher 
interest costs and spreads could be passed on to borrowers with nowhere 
to go. Industrial countries would obtain steadier oil nows as OPEC 
trades oil underground for the safe financial asset. The Fourth World 
could be induced, with m:xiest side payments, to give an appearance of 
legitimacy to such a reestablisnnent of centralized Northern control 
over international financial flows. Note that part of the iootivation 
for the proposed SUbstitution Account at the IMF was to meet OPEC's 
241dissatisfaction with available financial assets. 'lhis scenario 
would be the counterpart of the coalition between OPEC and the traditional 
oil nru.l.tinationals, which operates with great tensions and frictions 
but has been enonoously profitable for both sides so far. 
Unless a major international political crisis threatens to 
induce an old-fashioned financial panic, a thoroughgoing cartelization 
of capital markets is unlikely to be realized. As with transnational 
corporations, banks of different nationalities maintain rivalries which 
are not easily reconciled. Episodes such as those 1n 1974 involving 
the Herstatt Bank of Cologne and the Franklin National Bank of New York 
established the precedent that the Central Bank of each country would 
take care of the problems of banks owned by its citizens, no matter 
where those banks are located. 'Il'lis approach does not provide a fail-proof 
lender of last resort at the international level, but ellm1na.tes the 
roost salient brittleness of intemational banking. Naturally, this 
camutment by Central Banks has been accanpanied by a closer super-
vision of the portfolios of private banks, and the insistence that 
banks provide consolidated balance sheets covering all or their worldwide 
operations. 
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Du...'"ing the late 1970s the IMP was on the whole an ineffective 
bystander 1n the process of recycling oil surplus to major LDC borrowers. 
Years of obtuse and do~tic IMF staff work, especially in its Western 
Han1.sphere department, induced key LOCs to stay away. Cnly countries 
without options sought resources fran the Ftmd; such adverse selection 
reinforced that institution's wicked-witch image. 0ne·1nportant side 
effect of the 1970s expansion of international financial markets was to 
put pressure on the bureaucracies of the lMF (and to a lesser extent 
on those of the IBRD and regional banks) to rethink rigid policies, 
under pa.in of losing their legitimacy by having no dealings .with sane of 
the most important LDCs. It is m:x,t whether Brazil needs the IMF more 
than the IMF needs Brazil. 
An IMF with more nexible lending conditions seems to be 
emerging during 1980; it will be also necessary for it to obtain greater 
resources before it becanes an attractive major lerrler to large LDCs 
with several borrowing options. '1be Fourth World, however, could benefit 
quickly fran the new IMF. '!be IBRD and regional banks are also 
planning new rechanisms, especially connected with investments 1n energy 
and natural resources, to expand the resource nows to I.Des. Pleas 
for more concessional finance to the Fourth World continue to be heard. 
So long as toose trends do not significantly limit the options_ 
opened to LDC borrowers by private international f1nancial markets, 
1.e. , threaten to ioove 1n the direction of an international credit cartel, 
major LOC borrowers could benefit fran them. The major benefit would 
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probably be 1n the insurance they could proVide against major financial 
panics, and the influence such insurance would exert on the supply price 
of credit. Uncertainties surrounding the process of rolling over the 
debt to private banks, one c,f the major sources of preoe~upation for 
LOC borrowers, could be alleviated. 
Exactly how institutions such as the IMF' and the IBRD ~inge 
on capital markets will remain of maJor importance for LDC borrowers. 
Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela are 
not "small co1m:tries" in those markets and could have, especially if 
they acted together, a significant influence in framing new policies for 
the IMF and IBRD, as well as in the process of setting rules of the game 
ror the 1980s financial nows. 
As an exaI!l)le of a specific proposal for greater IMF or IBRD 
participation in financial intennediation which is unlikely to benefit 
major Ire borrowers one may mention the idea of having those institutions 
issue long-tenn bonds indexed to international inflation. Such a 
proposal would place a floor under real interest rates, to the delight of 
lenders. In exchange for such a concession, ultimate LDC borrowers 
using IMF or IBRD as intermediaries would prestmiably obtain larger infiows 
without roll-over headaches, as debt maturities would roore closely match 
real investment gestation periods. There is considerable room in inter­
national financial markets, especially 1n bond markets, for innovation 
and experimentation, but such initiatives, especially if they involve 
indexing, are best left to individua.l borrowers. Giving creditors an 
assurance of positive real rates of interest, backed by the international 
camunity represented by the IMF or IBRD, under the macroeconanic circ~ 
stances of the early 1980s appears to be an idea in the interest of 
neither LDC borrowers nor of 100st other countries. 
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The tone of this section has been based on an economic and 
financial outlook which is of rooderate optimism relative to catastrophic 
scenarios, or of m:xierate pessimism relative to the 1970s perfonnance. 
Major LDC borrowers will face·less favorable borrowing conditions, and 
the net capital inflows they will obtain will be less relative to their 
GNPs. other LDCs whose indebtedness grew less in the 1970s, however, 
could expand the-ir borrowing faster in the future. GNP growth rates 
of major LDC borrowers could decline sanewhat even relative to those 
of 1973-80, 'While pressure will continue to expand exports am restrain 
1.nports. Regardless of financial considerations, the adjustment to higher 
real energy prices will involve significant costs. Could matters become 
worse for major WC borrowers? What. if OECD CO\mtries allow steep 
declines 1n their GNPs, turn to 1930s-style protectionism, or refuse 
to allow their banks even to roll-over I.DC debts? In the spirit or the 
"scarce currency clause" of the IMF Articles of Agreement, under those 
circumstances LOCs would have little choice but to suspend, subject 
to negotiations, the servicing of their debt and to follow JOOre inward.­
oriented policies, perhaps revitalizing third world integration schemes. 
Gains from international specialization would decline, but even then 
many LDCs could maintain reasonable growth rates. 'Ihe largest semi­
industrialized countries would be in a better position to handle such 
a shock than the smaller IDCs, although the specific energy situation 
of each country will also heavily influence their perfonnance. Even 
under these circ\.UllStances JOOst LDC debtors will want to maintain substantial 
ccmnercial, financial, and technological links with Northern econan:i.es, 
enough to discourage them fran repudiating their debt. 
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VI. Latin American Fina'1cial Policies and Problems 
Previous sections suggest that on balance semi-industrialized 
co1.L11tries were helped by the emergence and expansion of private inter­
national financial markets·~ True enough, the costs of private credits 
were higher and of a shorter-tenn nature than official bilateral or 
multilateral finance. However, volumes were higher, procedures were 
rore expedite and looser strings were attached, both at the political 
and at the economic policy levels. But the opportunities created by the 
new international capital markets need not generate welfare gains in 
borrowing countries; funds may_be raised cheaply but spent so foolishly 
as to create repayment problems, and the availability of external finance 
can lead to lower danestic savings. Other questions of a socio-econanic­
nature, which we will review briefly in this section, have been raised 
concerning the 1970s external financial links of Latin America. 
Financial intermediation rose to preeminence in sane Latin American 
countries along with blossoming international capital markets. A practical 
orthodoxy developed preaching that "the more financial intermediation the 
better". Gurley and Shaw popularized correlation measures between 
the degree of financial DK>dernization and indexes of econanic development. 
Ronald McKinnon argued vigorously against "financial repression". Som:! 
graduates from the University of Chicago rose in the 1970s to policy­
making positions in Southern Cone govenvnents and started fnl:>lementing 
policies of financial liberalizatioo. Brazil and Mexico followed roore 
pragmatic policy courses, but 1n both countries foreign finance strongly 
influenced the rhyttm of econanic activity and the nature of govemment 
policy mak1ng during the 1970s. 
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Evidence on LDC ex-post sa\rl....ngs and real capital fonnation is 
sketchy for the oost recent years; for 1974-77 data indicate a maintenance 
or an increase in the share of gross domestic investment in GDP relative 
to 1972-73 for rost major groups of LOCs. Available savings rates for 
major Latin American cotmtries are presented in Table 12. Only three 
countries show a decline in savings rates relative to the late 1960s; 
paradoxically, _two of those countries ( Chile and Uruguay) have under­
gone financial liberalization. Bearing in mind the likely underestima.tion 
of danestic savings due to a lack of inflation-proof Balance of Payments 
accounting, the perfonnance of Brazil appears reasonable, and those 
for Argentina, Colanbia, Mexico and Venezuela also seem at least 
adequate for the period covered. 
Deregulation of financial markets in Southern Cone countries led 
to old-style banking losing canpetitive power to adventurescme but 
capital-short "financieras". Under these conditions, lack of goverrment 
insurance of depositors frequently resulted in panics and scandals, 
the regulatory sequel of which tended to strengthen the oligopolistic 
character of the local banking sector. 
'lbese trends were accanpanied by a substantial increase 1n the 
share of financial intermediation 1n the national econanies. A tendency 
towards the centralization of capital in the hands of econanic groups 
with a banking basis seems to have occurred.· "Old" industrialists lost 
economic power to "new" financiers. Sane Latin American economists feared 
that the banking sector would go through a process of denationalization, 
as Dilltinational banks benefitted fran deregulation to enter a market 
where previously only dcrnestic residents were allowed. 1-k>wever, danestic 
economic groups proved to be more active than anticipated by these economists; 
financial liberalization apparently proceeded along with new fonns of 
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TART ,r:; 12 
Gross National Savings 1n Selected Latin American Cotmtries
(Percentages of gross national product) 
1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-78 
Argentina 19.0 19.2 21.la/20.5
Brazil 21.1 21.8 23.8 22.3
Chile 13.1 15.0 11.8 6.7
Colombia 17.0 17.3 17.7 21.4
Mexico 17.3 19.4 19.1 21.#
Peru 22.8 16.8 14.3 10.1 
Urugua.y 12.6 13.8 10.2 10.6
Venezuela 32.1 29.4 35.1 34.8 
a/ Refers to 1975 through 1977 only. 
Sources: Adapted fran Table III-2, p.63, 1n Inter-American Development
Banlc, Economic and Social Progress 1n Latin America; 1979 Report,
Washington, D.C. Basic data are at current prices 1n national currencies. 
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association betwee~ danestic and foreign capital rather tha~ with a 
massive takeover of the former by the latter. 
Other econcrnists were concerned with the possibility that the 
substitution of "financi~_capital" for "productive capital 11 would 
impart a stagnationist bias to Southern Cone financial liberalization 
policies. We argue below that sane Keynesian problems have emerged, 
but that they are probably of a short to medium term nature, not of a 
long-run stagriationist variety. Nonetheless, it is hard to see what 
welfare gains can be generated by speculative act1Vity of the variety 
witnessed in Argentina during 1976-80. In this context, one should 
remember the following point of Kenneth J. Arrow: " ••• in speculative 
markets such as those for stocks and coom:xilty futures, a large am:>unt 
invested in the acquisition of new information for private advantage will 
yield no social gain, only a zero-sum redistribution•••We may have very 
able people who could be useful spending their t~ in production instead 
of trying to outwit others!1251 
'Ille progressive loss of goverrment control over IIX>netary aggregates 
in a context of openness to international financial markets confused 
policy makers and econanic analysts alike. Old style monetarists had to 
recycle themselves to get rid of their preoccupation with active monetary 
policy, reluctantly accepting the idea of an endogenous nnney supply. 
Structuralist economists on the other hand had to wrestle with their old 
propositions for passive ·money to becane active partisans of sterilization 
policies in the contest of a financially open econoozy. 
In the Southern Cone, the "new Chicago" eventually prevailed over 
the "old Chicago", and policy makers there, while furthering the processes 
of trade and financial liberalization,started seeking fixed nominal 
exchange rates as well as zero budget deficits. Prae,natism continued 
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to characterize Brazilia:1 and Colanbian policy-making. With va...rying 
degrees of success, these countries attempted to stick with a crawling 
peg without explicit targets, and to maintain seignorage over the 
m:>netary base by restrictiJ:ig access of domestic residents to inter­
national financial markets. Mexico wanted to follow a similar path, 
but 1n her case the task of avoiding currency substitution was made 
much m::>re difficult than in Brazil or Colombia, in view of her geo­
graphical and economic proximity to the United States. 
We conclude that the existence of a fiuid international financial 
market, by changing the nature of external economic incentives and 
penalties, nudged La.tin American economies into a new roold during the 
1970s. In principle, it extended the range of options opened to econanic 
policy making, hence providing new opportunities for econanic gain. 
But it also shaped the system of econanic incentives in particular 
directions and induced some shifts of relative econanic power within 
countries. In this context, the rules of access established by danestic 
policy makers seem to have been a basic detenninant of the short to medium 
term consequences of financial opermess. 'lbe returns are not all 1n 
yet, but fran our present perspective countries which followed a more 
p~tic and gradualistic course of action regarding domestic financial 
liberalization and links with international capital markets (as Brazil and 
Colanbia) seem to have done better than countries which pursued a roore 
doctrinaire policy course (as in the Southern Cone). 
'lbe use of indexed goveITJDant bonds is a characteristic feature 
of the financial refonns that have accanpanied the process of financial 
opermess 1n the Latin American context. In the remaWer of this 
section, we discuss sane Keynesian conundrums evoked by the experience 
of countries following this policy path. 
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According to the financial refonners, increased availability of 
financial paper paying positive real interest rates should both increase 
the now of private saving and divert wealth holding away frc:m non­
productive uses (land, housing, consumer durables) into productive assets. 
Latin-American experiences with financial reform confinn the pre­
diction about the increase in scrne forms of financial saving; however, 
private product~ve investment did not expand. The ex-ante propensity to 
save may go up but private investment rates are not larger than before. 
'lhis reaction to financial refonn has been accoopanied by persistently 
high inflation rates and lagging exchange rates. Reasons for thes~ 
Latin-American aberrations are not entirely clear, but sane conjectures 
are worth exploring. 
We consider successively stylized versions of the portfolio 
decisions related to the canposition of danestic currency-denanina.ted 
assets, and of the portfolio decisions concerning the distribution of wealth 
between danestic and international assets, before and after "financial 
liberation". 
In a financially repressed econany with a history of persistent 
inflation, wealth is held as JOOney, land, and capital. In relative•te~, 
the first two are haoogeneous coomodities whereas the latter is a collection 
of heterogeneous goods. Money is held because of 1ts property as a means 
of payment; capital, because of its expected yield in use; and land, as 
a shelter against inflation. Expected land yields may be low but they 
are strongly correlated with inflation rates, and thus safer to hold than 
heterogeneous capital. '!be liquidity of land is higher than capital but 
much lower than iooney. The real yield of the latter is strongly negative. 
Lack of a high yielding asset with a strong secondary market presumably 
underlies low observed saving propensities. Moreover, a high proportion 
of net additions to wealth take the form of unproductive land holdings 
for 11speculative" purposes. 
In this context, financial refonn-m:mgers typically propose intro­
ducing an 1ndexed government bond as an inst!"l..ment of financial liberation 
(in McKinnon's tenninology_th1s boils down to paying real interest rates 
on ''m:>ney") • In the presence of such an attractive asset w1th a strong 
back-up market, saving propensities should increase and a higher proportion 
of wealth be held as "productive" capital. An implicit h,ypothesis seems 
to be that the bond will protect wealth-owners against innation better 
than land holdings do. Hence, the required real rate of return on 
capital will be lower and thus capital accunulation will be favored for 
a given state of long-tenn expectations. 
As already noted, Iatin-American experience supports the prestunption 
regarding some financial savings, but not the expectation on private investment 
rates. The apparent reason is that indexed bonds tend to replace capital 
(and money) rather than land in private portfolio holdings. Free--market­
oriented financial refonns are accanpanied by a general liberalization of 
interest rates, 1n the context of a demand-contra.ctionary package of policies. 
Bankruptcies in the productive sector and panics and scandals 1n the 
financial sector are frequent. As a consequence, there is a weakening 1n 
the state of confidence with which expectations about future capital 
values are held. The demand price of capital falls and the rate of 
invest!lEnt adjusts downward at a time when saving propensities are on 
the increase. High short-tenn interest rates tend to raise the supply 
price of output in the short-run. Excess supply of nxmey may also obtain, 
in spite of contractionary nnnetary policies, if the demand for rooney 
(in the appropriate M:t_ concept) is sufficiently lowered by the 
introduction of indexed bonds. Continuing high infiation rates, 
higher unemployrrent rates, and lower growth rates of potential output 
are the short to medimn-tenn consequences of 111-1.n:plemented financial refonns. 
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Similar problems may occur with respect to the portfolio 
decisions vis-a-vis dollar- and peso-denaninated wealth. Capital 
market reformers correctly expect that the creation of danestic 
indexed bonds will induce .foreign as well as national wealth-owners 
to shift a higher proportion of their wealth out of dollar and into 
peso-denaninated assets. Experience confinns that foreign financial 
inflows are larger than before, as predicted by the theory, but also 
that they do not find a real outlet, as dcmestic absorption goes 
down following the mechanism sketched in the previous paragraph. 
Capital account surpluses are not matched by correspondingly large~. 
full-capacity current account deficits. Official foreign reserves 
accumulate and exchange rates lag behind purchasing power parities. 
'!be "retraso carnbiario" establishes itself, weakening exports and 
strengthening the propensity to inport; paradoxically enough, the 
level of activity in the tradable goods sector shrinks in order to absorb 
the :increased flow of foreign savings. 
Portfolio reshuffling favoring goverrrnent debt is a cooroon charac­
teristic of these examples of financial refonn. If the government uses 
the proceeds of higher bond sales either to increase its own investment 
or to subsidize private investment, real incane growth may be maintained, 
at the cost of increased goverrrnent intervention in the econanic sphere 
and expanding foreign debt. If the proceeds of higher bond sales are 
used to control the growth rate of money supply, inflation rates may subside 
but the rate of investment and potential output growth do not recover. 
Academic orthodoxy, f'ran Ma,ynard Keynes to James Tobin, has taught 
that the propensity to :invest 1s not cotenninous with the propensity to save. 
lack of attention to this basic teaching on the part of practical orthodoxy 
nay explain the failures of recent attempts at financial reform in 
La.tin America. Much research is needed on the patterns of substitution 
and complementarity annng-assets, in the context of high and varying 
rates of inflation characteristic of La.tin American countries. 
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